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Terms and Acronyms
CAO

Chief Area Officer (UNRWA manager of one of the three areas of the West Bank
Field)

CBO

Community-based organization

CSC

Camp Services Committee

CSO

Camp Service Office (UNRWA administrator of a Camp, reports to CAO)

e-Health

Electronic medical information system (UNRWA)

ERCD

External Relations and Communications Department (UNRWA)

FHT

Family Health Team (UNRWA)

HCC

Healthy Camp Committee

HCI

Healthy Camp Initiative (UNRWA)

HRCRT

Human Rights, Conflict Resolution and Tolerance

IDP

Internally displaced person

ISF

Israeli Security Forces

MTS

Medium Term Strategy (UNRWA)

Nakba

The Disaster: a memorial day of sorts held by Palestinians referencing the day
when some 700,000 Palestine Refugees initially took flight from their homes in
1948

NCD

Non-communicable disease

NGO

Non-governmental organization

NRC

Norwegian Refugee Council

oPt

occupied Palestinian territory

PCBS

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

PRM

(US Department of State Bureau of) Population, Refugees, and Migration

PSO

Programme Support Office (UNRWA)

RSSP

Relief and Social Services Programme (UNRWA)
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SEFSec

Socio-Economic and Food Security

SIT

School for International Training

SSNP

Social Safety Net Programme (UNRWA)

TVET

Technical and Vocational Education and Training (UNRWA)

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNRPR

United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (Precursor to UNRWA)

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

WBF

West Bank Field (UNRWA)

WBFO

West Bank Field Office (UNRWA)
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Abstract
Created over 67 years ago, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency has stood the test of
time, but perhaps not in the best of ways. It is one of the largest UN agencies, boasting an annual
budget that typically exceeds 1.3 Billion US$ and a staff of over 30,000, but it is not a commonly
known entity. UNRWA’s mandate is dedicated to one refugee populace from one ongoing
conflict: to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine Refugees, and by default
their descendants, fleeing from the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict (Appendix C). With decades of
failed peace attempts, and the agency’s mandate continually renewed by the UN General
Assembly, UNRWA has continued to serve this population as they have gone from tented
refugee camps to urban slums. This agency, built as a humanitarian project, has now become a
pseudo-government, with a staff of teachers and doctors. Unlike a government, and contrary to
the liberal ideals of the UN, there is little in way of consent or mandate from the population.
The research question: how does UNRWA’s structure, culture, and mandate shape its behavior
within the reality of its practices with Palestine Refugees, within the context of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and within its attempts to reconcile its identity conflict through participatory reforms.
This began with a study of UNRWA's needs, capacities, and preferences for participatory
practices, in agency planning and actions with refugees. Through the use of a Case Study,
observations, and interviews, this research intended to appraise the viability of participatory
action through the perspectives of several departments representing the strategic level, the
programme management level, and the field level of UNRWA’s West Bank Field Office.
The research found that there was a solid consensus amongst all interviewed that participatory
reforms were essential to the agency’s success, but responsibility for this reform process was not
clear. Participatory reforms were seen as a means to reconcile some issues of governance but
also to reduce future financial and service burdens on the agency. However, the strategic level
interviewees expressed concerns on the long-term existence of UNRWA; refugees are quite
dependent on UNRWA for basic services yet there is no exit strategy down the road. Since
UNRWA’s international mandate is apparently tied to the resolution of the conflict, the concern
is that UNRWA will reach a point of unsustainability before the conflict approaches a resolution.
In part, UNRWA is a tool used by both major conflicting groups. Using analysis from literary
sources, this paper argues that UNRWA is as much a victim as well as a support structure in the
larger conflict – trapped within decade’s worth of constructed identities and norms tied to
Palestine Refugees – and that the entire model is unsustainable. On a macro scale, UNRWA is
caught in a paradox of development best practices, do-no-harm humanitarian norms, and its
international mandate culminating in an ill-fated and inseparable track between itself, the
conflict, and the Palestine Refugees.
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Introduction
Overview of UNRWA
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency was an iteration of the UN system’s first attempt
at intervention in a major conflict. UN General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December
1949 mandated the purpose-build agency to carry out direct relief and works programmes for
Palestine refugees, and their descendants, fleeing from the 1948 conflict (Appendix C). With its
mandate consistently renewed by the UN General Assembly, for just over 65 years UNRWA has
provided food, education, healthcare, and other social services to over 5 million registered
Palestine Refugees spread across five fields, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Gaza, and the West Bank.
(UNRWA Refugees, 2016) While its mission has not changed much, the way UNRWA fulfills
its mandate has.
The tented UNRWA camps from the early decades of its existence have gone. In the West Bank
Field, camps which were once well outside city boundaries in the 1950’s, are now squarely
amidst them as these cites have grown. The majority of the West Bank Field’s 19 camps make up
a part or all of the urban slums in cities like Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, and even Jerusalem.
Even camps far removed from cities are overcrowded and densely populated, as territorial
boundaries are strictly enforced and those typically living inside the camps cannot afford to
move out. While this transition from campsite to slums took place, UNRWA evolved in stride to
match the service needs of these communities. Very few places in the world have dedicated and
marked UN schools and hospitals, physical brick and mortar structures owned and operated by
the agency and protected with international standards of UN neutrality. In the West Bank Field
alone there are 43 healthcenters and 96 schools, serving a registered population of 970,633
individuals. Equally rare are the tens of thousands of national-staff teachers, healthcare
professionals, and social workers who work directly for the agency and must adhere to the UN’s
standards and non-partisan codes of ethics.
Through this process of growth, UNRWA’s services have become institutionalized in these
communities, with an unknown proportion of the Palestine Refugee population becoming
dependent on their dedicated schools, health centers, and relief programs. In the West Bank,
municipalities from both sides of the conflict have, in many cases, designed city services to
exclude or bypass refugee camps. Rather than providing stopgap measures for a displaced and
transient populace, the Agency has become a permanent fixture in the region and a reminder of
the unsolved conflict. These gaps exist in the West Bank from the precarious nature of the ISF
occupation and the Oslo Accords, which divide governance and security responsibilities. In West
Bank cities where refugee camps exist, there is often active neglect from Israeli and Palestinian
authorities that – under normal conditions – would be the parties responsible for maintaining
services in these districts. This not to suggest that camps are completely isolated, they are by
their very existence tied into the cities or municipalities they reside in, it is more than few
institutions step up to take responsibility for this people, except for UNRWA.
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The stagnated state of the greater conflict’s peace process has recently forced some in the
Agency to address the nature of its role. Over the past few years UNRWA’s West Bank Field has
taken on projects such as sewage and water network reconstruction in addition to owning UN
marked trash compactors and staffing sanitation personnel to provide some form of city services
to its camps. This expectation from host governments that UNRWA can manage as a surrogate is
ultimately unrealistic though. There is no UNRWA police for enforcement, nor are there any
regulations imposed beyond those services that UNRWA controls. Furthermore, the agency faces
financial constraints that have forced austerity, most recently in August of last year where they
faced a 100 million dollar shortfall (Al Jazeera. 2015) that would have closed all UNRWA
schools for the start of the academic year if it not for a last minute funding drive. The Agency is
primarily beholden to their donors – mainly major global and regional powers like the United
States, the EU, and Saudi Arabia – and thus must balance donor expectations and funding with
the needs of a growing refugee population. Yet despite best intentions, there is also a severely
limited structure for Palestine Refugees to have a voice within UNRWA. It seems then that the
agency faces an existential crisis of identity: it is structured like a mix between a development
and humanitarian NGO, providing municipal style services for a population that is underserved,
and yet it is funded and mandated by foreign powers and the UNGA with their separate
regulation and agendas. Moreover, its identity is tied to that of the Palestine Refugee, having
only the duty to serve this population’s needs.
Participatory Action within UNRWA
From 2006 to 2010, an agency-wide restructuring took place, pushing reforms towards strategic
planning and protection of its services and partner communities. In addition to strategic planning,
the agency attempted to restructure the means by which refugee communities would interact with
the agency. However, UNRWA struggled to implement early attempts at participatory action
reforms, which would have been the mainstay of its service planning and execution. Due to a
variety of factors, participation mainstreaming was not achieved. Primary issues included: them
segregating the participatory planning team from the other core service programs (Education,
RSSP, and Health) and, specifically in the West Bank Field, a lack of balance between
community priorities, UNRWA’s policies, donor obligations, and practical security or resource
concerns during design and implementation phases of projects. After the 2008 global financial
crisis, funding from donor countries became limited, thus agency priorities demanded a move
away from this participatory team in order to support core programming.
Participatory action in the West Bank Field suffered, in a large extent, due to problematic
institutional size and structure for this style of reform within the WBFO and ineffective two-way
communication between stakeholders of the process. UNRWA’s ability to communicate with the
people it serves is critical to the fulfillment of its mandate. Without access to effectively
communicated information, refugees can find themselves without the tools to access the services
they qualify for, struggling to meet application requirements, and feeling frustrated with
UNRWA itself. This in turn limits the Agency’s ability to receive feedback, build trust, and
9
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create programmes and programming that responds to the needs of Palestine Refugees.
Furthermore, when communication only flows one way, from the Agency to the refugee, the
latter is not able to fulfill their potential as a partner and remains disempowered. These dynamics
– plus the already structured disparity of the poorest or geographically restricted refugees
dependent on UNRWA for basic services – creates a drastic power imbalance between the served
and the service provider. This puts UNRWA in a precarious situation, against development best
practices.
In WBF refugee communities, representation and communication practices with UNRWA are
fragmented and are not universally accessible to refugees. Given the complexity of UNRWAs
institutional structure, this is understandable considering how the average refugee does not have
a dedicated method of communicating with Field Office staff or Programme management. Thus
refugees will use any means available to field their questions or complaints, especially if they do
not have a regular forum to do so. But the problem of representation is not exclusively within
UNRWAs control. Mainstay refugee representative institutions, like the WBF’s Camp Service
Committees may not completely represent the population’s needs and can be mired in political
dealings. These are elected councils, primarily comprised of elderly men affiliated with host
government political parties, who are suppose to take interest in coordinating services with
UNRWA. However, as of late many CSCs have been at odds with the Agency, as austerity has
taken place and perspectives over UNRWA’s role in the conflict raise questions of its mandate
commitments and loyalties.
Communication between field programmes and coordinating information received from
UNRWA’s two external stakeholder groups, refugees and donors, inhibits a participatory
structure from taking root. The programmes are themselves caught in between several strategic
forces – from ERCD to the HQ Programmes to the Field Front Offices – reinforcing the
complexity of reform implementation. Coordination on day-to-day operations between the
strategic offices, the programmes, and the field services presents its own set of challenges; major
changes to operations or projects could compound on these to disastrous affect.
These themes, the lack of comprehensive avenues of communication, deficiency in quality
information sharing, the absence or true representation, and the non-ownership of UNRWA
service provision amongst refugees creates a setting of distance and distrust between Agency and
refugee. This conflicts with the strategic principles implemented by UNRWA less than a decade
ago; the right to access services and information as well as participate in meaningful decision
processes forms two of the Agency’s seven Protection principles (UNRWA Protection
Principles, 2012) and are entrenched in Strategic Objective 1 of UNRWA’s Medium Term
Strategy (UNRWA MTS, 2015) and are clearly outlined in the Agency’s Protection policy.
When these rights are denied both parties suffer from a greater divide of miscommunication and
mistrust.
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Overview of Practicum
In light of the 2008 financial crisis, UNRWA began making strategic plans for the agency in
2009. By 2010, the West Bank Field Office’s Programme Support Office was formed to help
coordinate UNRWA programming in accordance with the Agency’s new strategic plan. In 2014,
the West Bank Field Office’s PSO instituted the Long-Term Internship Programme to allow
Masters Candidates a practicum for their capstone research, during a yearlong internship to work
within PSO. Unlike a standard UNRWA internship, the long-term intern has time to better
understand the operational environment of the West Bank Field and can support larger
initiatives. In addition to a year of work experience within the UN system, the intern takes this
position with the expectation to complete their practicum research project, which can either
directly or indirectly benefit the agency. Beginning in 2014 as a pilot, the programme has already
been considered a success and will be expanding within the next two years.

Design
Approach
While the methods, tools, and procedures of this research project remained mostly consistent as
planned, the intent of the research evolved the issues under discussion. What began as an
appraisal of the WBFO’s ability to implement participatory reforms led to an analysis regarding
governance. As interviews progressed, it was clear to the researcher that there were deeper issues
beyond the reforms UNRWA was pursuing. In one interview with a strategic level staff member,
it was noted that there were difficulties improving basic housing an infrastructure in camps
because UNRWA had no means to implement or enforce housing policies. This brought forward
a discussion on governance and political theory: what defines UNRWA’s position for refugees,
are they more government welfare or aid provider? To address this question, the research was
adapted to inquire more from interviewees and observations. The project continued to appraise
the ability of the WBFO’s participatory reform process, however – for the purposes of this
capstone – the data obtained was used to explore how UNRWA’s identity as a humanitarian
agency supposedly playing a role reserved for governments plays into the stagnated setting the
conflict is in.
The Introduction briefly highlighted the dynamics between UNRWA and its stakeholders from a
tangible sense, the delivery of services and relationships. There are of course more intangible
relations to discuss. UNRWA’s mandate to provide for the Palestine Refugees is a unique
commitment – a dedicated agency for a single population – no other UN agency provides a
similar level service. It is no wonder that after more that 60 years of time together that the
Palestine Refugee identity is tied with the UNRWA identity.
The analysis of this paper examines UNRWA from the perspectives of what is generally
accepted as humanitarian organizations and government agency practices in order to reflect on
the Agency’s efforts to remain relevant and reform, as there is no end to their mandate in sight.
11
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In doing so, there are implications for the Palestine Refugee identity, particularly to their status
as “refugees” and their split relationships between UNRWA and their “host governments”.
Furthermore, both are linked in their existence, would there be Palestine Refugees to this day
without UNRWA? Would UNRWA exist without Palestine Refugees? In an attempt to analysis
these questions, this capstone will use the observations, interviews, and literary research to give
contrasting opinions with the hopes of prompting a dialogue on these topics.
Research Questions
In an attempt to evaluate the condition of UNRWA’s institutional capacity to address its
accessibility and existential conflicts, a research question was devised to encompass the breadth
of the topic:
How does UNRWA’s structure, culture, and mandate shape its behavior within its
practices, within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and within its attempts to
partially reconcile its identity conflict through participatory reforms.
During the case study of the Healthy Camp Initiative, sub-questions were developed for the
interviews that were designed to prompt frank discussions on the WBF’s capacity for reform and
lead into discussions on UNRWA’s identity and role.
1. What are the lessons learned and best practices from the Healthy Camp Initiative?
a. How has the HCI been designed to be participatory?
b. Does the reality reflect the design?
c. What have been some challenges for the initiative? (Organizationally,
environmentally, culturally, and practically)
d. What are the metrics to self-appraise the Initiative’s success?
e. What are lessons learned from the Initiative thus far?
f. Incorporating the above, what are some best practices to be applied to other
UNRWA activities of similar scope?
2. How does participation in UNRWA compare to participatory action principles?
a. Is participatory action important for UNRWA? If so, why?
b. What is the goal of participatory projects/reforms within UNRWA?
c. What has UNRWA participation looked like?
d. Is the HCI an evolution or reiteration of UNRWA participatory action?
e. How does the HCI’s components compare on a participatory ladder model?
3. How feasible is a truly participatory environment between UNRWA and refugees?
a. How does UNRWA’s size, scope, and capacity help or hurt a participatory style?
b. Is a participatory style desirable for both parties?
c. How does UNRWAs current role, and possibly its historical identity, impact a
transition to a partnership role?
d. What limits has UNRWA reached in the WBF in its capacity to serve and fulfill
its mandate?
During interviews, the researcher did not stay strict to these questions – allowing instead for
discussion to proceed naturally – for depth on particular issues. This resulted in better insight
12
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into the agency’s previous reform attempts and impressions from staff members on the direction
the agency is heading, at least as it pertains to the West Bank Field.
Methods and Tools
The research process consisted of several core components, primarily executed by way of a case
study of UNRWA’s Healthy Camp Initiative:
•

•

•

Tiered interviews with UNRWA staff involved in participatory action reforms within the
agency and/or the HCI project. Some staff may cross these tiers with their duties, likely
programmatic staff, but this will provide much more benefit than hindrance, as they can
comment on the interlinks.
o Strategic – Management level staff members who have overseen the transition to
mainstreaming participation as an UNRWA strategic objective, giving insight into
the agency level structural decision making process and implementation planning.
o Programmatic – Staff who have implemented or adapted the participatory
strategic policy (or independently applied the core of the principles of the policy)
o Field – Implementation staff or community partners who have direct and
consistent contact with refugees on the HCI project and beyond; they can give
perspective on the reality of the relationships and structures built through the HCI
and participatory mainstreaming.
Observations of UNRWA’s procedures, activities, and interactions or messaging between
UNRWA and refugees (HCI camp teams working with community partners and other
meetings centered on HCI or UNRWA project planning and implementation.
Additionally observing managers engaging staff or community members and staff
engaging each-other or community members on research relevant topics or structure,
participation, communication, and strategy).
A theme relevant literature review to provide expert reflection on the same challenges
UNRWA faces within participatory action, governance, and its identity. This includes
articles from authors with insider experience and opposing opinions of UNRWA.

The interviews were rather cyclical, in attempt to develop and respond to new questions
discovered in conversations with those from different tiers.
The HCI case study attempted to produce qualitative data on the progress and challenges of a
participatory action projects in UNRWA’s WBFO and the Agency’s HQ. Since the HCI is
implemented in two of the WBFs camps, the case study was mainly based in Shu’fat and Aida
camps. The HCI is unique as a case study on this topic, as it not only embodies a participatory
approach, but also contains cross-programmatic elements and heavily donor influenced and
involved.
As an initial estimate, the research was to have 8 to 10 interviews to help produce the HCI case
study. The end result was 13 individuals interviewed, 9 of whom were direct contributors to the
13
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case study project (the HCI) while the remaining 4 were interviewed on broader issues of
participatory reforms and responsibilities of UNRWA (Table 2).
Table 1: Stakeholders Identified for Research
Stakeholder Group
Research Objective
UNRWA Staff
• Identify historical context
of participatory reforms
within UNRWA
• Inform questions for
interviews with CBOs and
Refugee participants
• Understand the
desirability, feasibility,
challenges and
opportunities of
participatory action
reforms within UNRWA
at a strategic,
programmatic, and field
level
• Understanding of roles
within HCI
• Thoughts on HCI project
in reflection of the above
Refugee participants
• Understanding of roles
within HCI
• How they communicate
best with UNRWA on HCI
• How they send feedback to
UNRWA on HCI
• Governing structure of
HCI
• Model ideal relationship
with UNRWA
• Thoughts on HCI project
in reflection of the above
Community Based
• Understanding of roles
Organizations
within HCI
• How they communicate
best with UNRWA on HCI
• How they send feedback to
UNRWA on HCI
• Governing structure of
HCI
• Model ideal relationship

Research Method
• Interviews/Analysis
• Observations (during
interactions with refugees)

•
•

Interviews/Analysis
Observations (during
interactions with UNRWA
staff)

•
•

Interviews/Analysis
Observations (during
interactions with UNRWA
staff)

14
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•

with UNRWA
Thoughts on HCI project
in reflection of the above

Table 2: Interview Subjects by Association with HCI
Directly Involved in
Not Involved in HCI
HCI
Strategic
2
1
Programmatic
1
3
Field
6
0
Total
9
4
Table 3: Interview Subjects by Gender
Male
Strategic
2
Programmatic
0
Field
5
Total
7

Female
1
4
1
6

Table 4: Interview Subjects by National/International Status
National
International
Strategic
1
2
Programmatic
2
2
Field
6
0
Total
9
4

Total
3
4
6
13

Total
3
4
6
13

Total
3
4
6
13

Overview of the Case Study
The Healthy Camp Initiative
UNRWA’s West Bank Field Office operates many large projects on a simultaneous basis, but
few are as cross-sector as the Healthy Camp Initiative. Originally an unfunded initiative which
began in late 2013, the Healthy Camp Initiative was modeled after the WHO’s Healthy City
Initiative. The focus was to empower Community Based Organizations from a vulnerable
refugee camp within the WBF to collaborate with UNRWA and amongst themselves in order to
achieve community goals regarding the Social Determinants of Health. These Determinates
cover a range of issues, but are mostly founded in poverty and environmental sanitation: for
example unemployment, food security, education are all key pillars of Social Determinates of
Health. The WBFO Health Programme chose Shu’fat Camp as their pilot location, due to its
uniquely underserved population with challenging security issues. Without providing funding for
community projects, the initiative began by simply networking and connecting with CBOs and
community leaders. Over the next few years the CBOs – along with HCI team members –
15
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developed the Healthy Camp Committee in Shu’fat to coordinate CBO resources and activities.
As a continued result from this, the HCC executed several projects that cleaned up areas of
Shu’fat Camp and provided opportunities for the community to fund raise on its own behalf.
With this initial success, and a relatively cooperative environment established, the WBFO sought
donor funding to continue the initiative. In July of 2015, and with a grant from PRM, the HCI
was given funding for a structured two-year timeline, with deliverables on capacity building,
needs assessments, and community activities addressing the Social Determinates of Health. The
Front Office of the WBFO decided to include Aida Camp into the HCI; unlike Shu’fat, Aida
Camp had no HCI involvement or structure before starting into the PRM funded two-year
timeline. As part of the agreement with PRM, by the summer of 2016 UNRWA would carry out
an assessment of Best Practices and Lessons learned on the initiative thus far and present their
findings.
Shu’fat and Aida
Shu’fat and Aida (Ayda) camps are densely populated urban areas within the boundaries of
Jerusalem and Bethlehem, respectively. They are both considered “Front Line Camps” by the
WBFO, camps which face critical protection issues and have special needs based on conflict
related incidents or outcomes. (Figure 1)
Figure 1: East Jerusalem
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Source: UNOCHA oPt - East Jerusalem 2007
Technically within the boundaries of the Jerusalem municipality unilaterally declared by Israel,
Shu’fat camp is in the midst of a densely populated urban area that has been cut off from the rest
of the city by the Israeli West Bank Barrier (a 20 foot concrete wall with security towers). The
Barrier creates many issues for the residents of Shu’fat: there are no security forces or police
present to maintain law and order, apart from ISF raids. Jerusalem municipal services mostly
neglect the area, causing trash and sewage issues; the security checkpoint that controls the flow
of traffic out of the Shu’fat area prevents ease of access to education, medical facilities, and
employment. The result is an often-dangerous environment, with high unemployment and high
crime, isolated from service or support. Just beyond the barriers one can find settlements – illegal
under International Law – well maintained and serviced by the Jerusalem municipality. To
exemplify the point: the Israeli settlement of Pisgat Ze’ev, north of the Barrier, appears to be
well designed and well serviced by the Jerusalem municipality, the same municipality Shu’fat is
17
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under (Figures 1 and 2). While there is more than just the refugee camp within the cordoned off
area (Figure 2), there is little distinction of this on the ground as the entire area is considered a
crowded urban slum. From an areal view, one can identify the boundaries of the actual Shu’fat
camp by the density of the buildings, as they are closer together to maximize housing space for
the Palestine Refugees. UNRWA has tried to provide basic water, sewage, and garbage removal
services in addition to its schools and health centers. Yet because there is are additional
neighborhoods within the Barrier with Shu’fat camp, these other residents often take advantage
of UNRWA services, since they are not otherwise provided for by the Jerusalem municipality;
thus it is increasingly difficult for UNRWA to gauge consumption and needs.
Figure 2: Shu’fat Camp Satellite View

Aida has its own share of challenges; the Barrier runs across the northern border of the camp,
which has stifled not only the commercial ambitions of the residents but also the expansion of
Bethlehem. Densely packed with buildings, Aida residents have little reprieve from their
claustrophobic urban camp. The barrier presents a flash point for Palestinian and ISF clashes,
which results in a hazardous environment for those living in the camp. Tear gas shot by the ISF
during clashes and raids filter into residences due to the claustrophobic nature of the camp,
producing no safe space for the non-rioters. UNRWA’s Aida Boys School – built in the 1950s –
sits across the road from the ISF Barrier, thus making the safety of the students a constant
protection issue. Law enforcement is also problematic, while a majority of the camp falls under
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the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority in Bethlehem, the proximity of an ISF outpost at
Rachel’s Tomb makes regular patrols impossible. (Figure 3)
Figure 3: Aida Camp Satellite View

Limitations
Time forced this research to remain as a preliminary evaluation on the very vast topic of
participation and UNRWA’s future. It was adapted to produce a review of best practices and
lessons learned upon reviewing the HCI in order to begin cross-programmatic collaboration on
the issues facing the agency.
Some observation opportunities were restricted due to political sensitivities, highlighting that this
is not a relaxed environment to conduct work in nor are all parties readily cooperative. UNRWA
WBFO went to great lengths to provide this researcher access to key personnel, though there
might not have been as much follow up as what would have been desired due to tight schedules
and given the limited time this research had remaining with UNRWA.
The use of those interviewed as a sample group of feelings present in UNRWA creates obvious
issues, as the sample cannot guarantee total representation of other staff members or the agency’s
official stance.
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Ethics
Given the tenuous security environment in the West Bank Field, the researcher made every effort
to ensure that research activities complied with UNRWAs security policies as to avoid
unnecessary risk to participants.
All research participants were well informed about the parameters and conditions of the research,
and asked to give their written consent before participating. The research will not include
specific names of individuals or their titles, in order to provide freedom of expression on this
topic. Participants had the option to withdraw their consent to participate at any time. Strictly
confidential documents and/or internal communications will not be quoted or cited. Should
information arise during the research that indicates a participant is at risk of psychological or
physical harm, they would have been offered referral to appropriate services.
Support
Support from UNRWA was essential to this research. Access to management, officer level, and
ground staff was acquired thanks to the deliberate effort of members of the WBFO-PSO, with the
approval of the Front Office.
Translation and transportation was also crucial to the success of this project, in addition to
transportation and office supplies. Access to reports, data, and policies of UNRWA provided
valuable information on the projections this study makes. Finally, invitation to observe UNRWA
staff and refugee dialogues (in large or small group settings) provided valuable insight into
current practices, beyond what is referenced in interviews.
Deliverables
As an outcome of this project, the researcher will use the data collected from the case study of
the Healthy Camp Initiative to inform both this capstone project and produce a set of lessons and
best practices to provide to UNRWA for their use in appraising the status of the HCI. This set of
lessons and best practices will be developed separate from the capstone paper and include
information pertinent for the appraisal of the HCI but may not be relevant to this capstone’s
theme, and thus distinct.

Findings
Case Study
Overview
As it was noted in Design, interviewees were solicited with the condition of anonymity. Quotes
used from interviewees will be identified by their tier – strategic, programmatic, or field – rather
than their name or organizational title. Interviewees were asked about their experience with
UNRWA, their thoughts on participatory reform within UNRWA, how the HCI applies these
concepts, and finally how this initiative and reforms in general support UNRWA’s mission.
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Lessons and Practices from the HCI
There was a significant amount of consensus within the pool of interviewees. Many of the
lessons discussed were not specifically associated with the HCI. Instead they are underlying
issues between UNRWA and WBF refugee communities that, due to the participatory approach
of the HCI, were uncovered as issues to take note of on a field or agency wide level. Indeed the
themes identified – Communication, Trust, and Engagement – are not mutually exclusive from
one another. One programmatic interviewee distilled these concepts as an overarching theme of
Dignity: something that can be easily neglected or sacrificed in an intensive bureaucratic process.
Institutional structure, another core theme, is the possible source of these issues.
The HCI experienced some set backs due to a hard power approach to engaging communities,
something that highlighted a behavior pattern with prior attempts at participatory reform.
Interviewed Field personnel noted that in Aida Camp – when compliance from partnering CBOs
was not forthcoming – WBFO’s management responded in a way that was “heavy-handed”,
threatening to end future cooperation with the CBO. This caused a significant rift with the trust
built by the HCI team in the community, fracturing the CBOs into two opposing sides for a brief
period of time. Thankfully, due to the effective engagement from the HCI team and UNRWA
programme leadership, the issues has been resolved. A field level HCI staff in Aida noted that
this incident was the excuse the Camp Service Committee needed to push their own agenda,
taking the dissent of one CBO and adding their claims as part of the conditions for resolving the
issue. In other words, UNRWA’s response to this incident gave an excuse for dissent and forced
the HCI team to manage multiple grievances at once in a climate of non-cooperation. As a result,
the threat could not be executed without significant damage to the HCI, its activities, and the
progress UNRWA had made in the community as a whole.
The two camps involved in the HCI, Shu’fat and Aida, began the initiative in completely
different ways. Shu’fat was under the HCI model for at least two years before the PRM funded
project started, while Aida was included at the outset of the funded project only one year ago. A
strategic level staff member noted that Aida was included because “…we knew it would be a
challenge.” (strategic level interviewee). The differences between the two camps progress can be
boiled down to a simple lesson, noted by the HCI Field and Programme staff: in Shu’fat they had
established a repertoire and working relationships with the Healthy Camp Committee well before
any funding, and even had some accomplishments to note. On the other hand in Aida they had no
such foundation; with funding in play, the interactions and relationship building between the
UNRWA staff and Aida Camp CBOs became more complicated.
The HCI is designed to give a lot of control to the community; by bringing in funding before
relationships were established it became a difficult balance of meeting the appropriate needs
highlighted by the CBOs and avoiding the political maneuvers of those who saw opportunity
with this cash infusion. One field staff who has been working closely with the Aida Camp
Services Committee noted that their desire for more infrastructure funding was mostly political, a
chance to exhibit a show of importance and activity to the community. The staff member also
21

Mandate in Conflict

Chris Mattera

raised concerns that the Camp Services Committee would not actually use any additional funding
for actual infrastructure projects. Yet their cooperation is essential, and therefore it complicates
the work of the HCI team, requiring them to play more politics than expected. In Shu’fat,
relationships were built separate from any ambition of funding sources. Using their own
resources and networks, Shu’fat CBOs and HCI Committee would need to support their own
projects or find their own funding, with UNRWA in support. Field staff noted this was a simpler
relationship to build than Aida and one that is far easier to work with, despite other challenges.
Some noted that the ease in which Shu’fat’s HCI programme versus the difficulty in Aida could
have been impacted by UNRWA history with these two camps. While certainly a possibility,
what is clear is that the approaches in Aida particular were seen, in hindsight by the HCI team, as
a set back for improving the relationships. With that said, the best practice formed was that with
trust established and needs assessed beforehand, there is a greater chance for consensus on
community priorities when funding does come through.
Part of building and maintaining trust during the formation of the HCI was setting standards that
both the CBOs and UNRWA staff committed to. This included basic logistics, such as being
prompt and regular with meetings, but also formation of norms and standards that both parties
(UNRWA and the CBOs) would agree and adhere to. Without those guarantees progress would
stagnate. While UNRWA applies these concepts consistently with MOUs in other projects, it’s
rare to have them applied to many different partnering specialist organizations from one
community at once. Moreover, since the aim of the HCI is to be participatory, the consistency is
critical for CBOs in the Healthy Camp Committee to feel in control about their own decisions,
calculating our response based on our commitments and agreed norms.
Agreed upon by all UNRWA staff interviewed, the Agency conflicts itself in its roles that reflect
a surrogate government. West Bank refugees rely on UNRWA services but its mandate is not
derived from this same population, there is an inherent power imbalance to the relationship.
Palestine Refugees, dependent on UNRWA’s service and institutions, have little recourse in how
the agency behaves. Particularly through this period of austerity, the WBFO has encountered still
protest from refugees who have little control over the changes. While UNRWA’s mandate has
been generally unchanged, even the smallest of steps to reduce services for cost savings have
cast doubt amongst community partners about the agency’s intentions and direction, breading
misinformation and mistrust.
As noted earlier, there are intrinsic connections within the themes, trust can be swiftly broken
through ineffective or infrequent communication; restoring trust through effective
communication takes time and appropriate engagement. Some staff complained that followthrough on commitments, requiring prompt action and cooperation from the Front Office and
Support Departments, was one area where trust-building was vulnerable. An example noted by a
strategic level individual was one of Memos of Agreement between UNRWA and CBOs for the
HCI projects. While these were successfully negotiated, the processing on UNRWA’s end of
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producing the actual certified MOU documents has been extremely delayed, which has caused
doubt on the commitment to fester amongst the community partners.
At the same time, the interviewees acknowledge that the Agency faces a difficult reality of its
financial and structural limitations. As an alternative approach to building trust without
overextending Agency recourse, one strategic level individual proposed a strategy of active
listening as their best tool in liaising with refugees. In practice, this researcher observed instances
where refugees were more interested in their problems being heard by an active listener than they
were concerned with promises of immediate and specific commitments. In truth, an affirmation
of the validity of their concerns, and a commitment on the part of UNRWA to address them, can
go a long way towards improving standing between the community and the agency. In the
context of the HCI, success has been driven through actions like this, neutralizing the inherent
power imbalance between UNRWA representative and refugee. The key step from this however
is follow-through, less the initial trust built falls apart due to neglect. In that stead, the agency
will have to reconcile its own bias, interpreting its own needs as needs of the refugees, with that
of effectively representing the refugee population through participatory action.
The HCI has also had the benefit of direct intervention from key managers within UNRWA,
according to those interviewed. The Field actors noted that support from the Front Office and
Health Programme Chief for West Bank significantly impacted their work, particularly when it
came to building credibility with partners. On the other hand, these same Field personnel noted
that this is not a common trend within UNRWA, and in fact they had doubts that support from
the level of the DUO, D/DUO(P) or other Programme Chiefs would result in actual
commitments to engage and meet with HCI partners. This appeared to take place under the
previous administration but fell through during the interim, even as decisions came down that
affected their work (i.e. the Aida incident with UNRWA’s heavy handed response).
While Field personnel did not expect management to attend all meetings, they indicated
examples where the presence of the manager gave them a lot more capital with the community
partners and encouraged engagement. To this end, management should balance their own
schedule to include field time whenever possible, particularly in projects where participation is a
factor. Recalling back to Communication and Trust, often the presence of an active listener, and
one at an upper level of management, can give a weight to the needs of the community and build
desire for them to work with UNRWA. In addition to this, meeting with community members on
their own terms is a useful tip to diffuse the power imbalance. Managers should seek
opportunities to attend community meetings that are already scheduled to take place and do not
seek to celebrate the arrival of this manager.
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On UNRWA and the WBFO
Power Dynamics
As noted above, the power dynamics are inherently flawed; UNRWA will naturally have an
overarching position of power over refugee communities due to the dependency the population
has for its services. Further analysis will indicate however that wielding this power UNRWA has
is often a lot more complicated than its appearance. With that in mind, several interviewees
noted that UNRWA’s status, as the de facto government service provider, does not mean the
agency wields the same authority as one.
To address the power imbalance, information must be considered like a basic commodity. In
scarcity it can cause tension and disruption. While changes in programming or services might be
unavoidable, if UNRWA is constantly and equitably engaged with communities, the agency
could find more room for understanding when these changes occur. As a recent case-in-point,
UNRWA HQ informed other UN Agencies about the 2015 financial trouble the agency faced
before UNRWA’s own staff let alone the refugees, this produced unnecessary tension and an
impression of mixed priorities
The agency behaves in a political method, guarded and often risk adverse. Its concern for
preserving its integrity is not uncommon amongst other large organizations, just unusual given
its neutral and humanitarian nature. Through this culture of risk aversion, Field and
Programmatic staff noted that the upper management of UNRWA has made decisions that they
felt had greater weight on organizational preservation than a refugee centered approach. Part of
this issue is the lack of resources; management must prioritize to continue operations.
However, this researcher noticed a subtle behavior; some interviewees and other personnel
occasionally justified the austerity and organizational self-preservation by stating that UNRWA’s
interests are in the best interests of Palestine Refugees, therefore the Agency must do everything
in its power to remain functional under all conditions. The lack of systemic participatory
practices would suggest that this is unfounded in fact, and more of an assumption based on the
intrinsic link between the two groups.
Consensus
At least from those engaged in interviews, there seemed to be a great deal of agreement. The
belief of the researcher is that this can be accounted for a similarity in perspectives on the
Agency’s status, likely a result of these individuals working closely together. Through the
consensus on the issues, a series of proposals could be made for guiding reform efforts. They can
be distilled down to these summarized points:
•

The participatory lessons of the HCI should be institutionalized as the new norms for the
WBF

24

Mandate in Conflict
•
•

•

Chris Mattera

Doing so would require staff to be trained, empowered, and held accountable to these
standards as roles are delegated out from the Field Office
Donors should be educated in the cost saving potential, forewarned on the time it takes
to create these participatory relationships, and overall included in direct contact with
communities to allow for donor-refugee partnerships to occur
The field can take the lead in developing their strategy for these participatory reforms,
since limited direction is coming from HQ in the foreseeable future

The New Norms
Going forward, several interviewees expressed how the participatory nature of this initiative
should be the new standard for all agency interactions with refugee communities. Refugee
communities in and outside of camps have grown their own resources and community capacity,
to not leverage these partners in an equitable manner would be a failure on the agency’s part in
furthering the dignity and care of these communities. Moreover, the initiative has brought
together staff with similar views on the matter of participation, thus successfully applying these
practices into an UNRWA project. These assets are limited however, an effort needs to be made
to institutionalize their best practices of communication, trust and relationship building, and a
new perspective on UNRWA’s power dynamics in order to sustain these types of projects on a
larger scale. In other words, relying on these individuals to carry through these reforms is not a
sustainable way forward, policy approaches should be discussed, at least at the field level, on
ways to apply these practices wholesale.
Delegation
If the new norms of participatory components were enacted, the burden of work that would be
placed on field leadership, such as Front Office roles, would be enormous. Since relationships
with an agency such as UNRWA require communities to be put at ease that their agreements will
not be rejected or neglected by higher-ups they do not interact with, it is critical that they have
meeting with people in positions of authority or direct access to it (as was done with the HCI). It
was mentioned by a few interviewees that more delegation would need to take place for an
effective transition to this type of reform; particularly, using the position of Chief Area Officer
and Camp Service Officers to have a more dynamic role in the participatory process. Yet
interviewees also casted their doubts; concerns were voiced that some CSOs would be unsuited
to take on these types of responsibilities, in the same spirit of cooperation and equity. Therefore,
delegation of this responsibility should be paired with deliverables that not simply dictate what
participatory action is taken, but how it is taken: is it done so in a respectful manner, do they
have the trust of the community. For greater participation, it might even be effective to ask the
community their thoughts on the performance of their CSO or CAO, where relevant. This is not
to say that all CSOs were cast in a negative light: Aida’s CSO for example was praised by
several interviewees, independent of any direct question to that affect, on his performance under
the Healthy Camp Initiative.
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Donor Involvement
Donors have historically been managed through ERCD, but this initiative has highlighted that
communities have the capacity to seek out and advocate for their own funding. In the interest of
developing better donor/community relationships, it should be examined how ERCD can
facilitate this type of activities. As an example, ERCD can act more as a matchmaker, receiving
funding requests from communities (through UNRWA channels) and matching them to
appropriate donors or funds. This gives a sense of project ownership for the community while
establishing dialogue between donors and the communities. This would only be possible for
smaller amount and would not be an overhaul of ERCD activities, merely a means for UNRWA
to be a facilitator and partner for communities seeking funding rather than an arbiter.
With the agency under financial strains, it is also beneficial to show that participatory reforms
can not only cost less to implement but can save money over the long term, as several
interviewees attest. Shu’fat’s initial success with the HCI had little funding or support from
UNRWA or other donors; they cleaned up street corners and organized events solely on their
own accord. If UNRWA becomes more of a network and a partner than an implementer it can
find other resources and actors willing to support similar initiatives to its own. In cost savings,
UNRWA can find local partners willing to take on tasks that it cannot and can give credibility to
its planning with needs assessments that reflect community priorities. Done right, this can help
UNRWA focus on larger items such as health and education services while still taking an active
role in fulfilling the needs of the refugee communities. UNRWA is no longer the sole provider
for Palestine Refugees in the modern context; but bringing donors to the forefront of its
participatory process, using community resources under and UNRWA network, and using needs
assessments to prioritize funding can help make the agency more participatory, transparent, and
cost effective.
HQ and the Field
Finally, most of the Strategic, Programme, and Field level personnel decried the lack of strategic
guidance from HQ on participatory reform initiatives. The Department of Planning is currently
developing guidelines to encourage these types of practices in the fields, while Protection at HQ
has participation with in the top 5 of its principle activities. Yet these are light steps into deep
issue and ultimately Field personnel stated they felt unguided when developing policies on
participation without a clear strategic framework under or to support them. Since the field cannot
control the process of HQ, it could be an opportunity for the West Bank Field to develop an
example of good participatory policy for the agency to model. This would require a managerial
level strategy, to be developed and vetted, where participatory activities could be integrated over
time into the operations of the field.
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Analysis
Overview
The case study demonstrated some of WBF’s challenges in modernizing the Agency to produce
more equitable partnerships with its refugee communities. However, this has thus far been
discussed on a program planning and operational level. But it is important to explore the base
struggles that dog the agency. The analysis takes a look at UNRWA’s past, its trajectory to this
point and what limitations directed its actions, in order to find out how it has reached this point.
This moment is a critical period in UNRWA’s history, not only does it have the weight of its
growing population to serve, but also increased financial and political pressures that must be
balanced. Furthermore, the Agency is linked in to the constructed identity of the Palestine
Refugee and to the conflict as a whole. Examining these links can help UNRWA navigate the
politics and prepare, hopefully, for the day it is relieved of duty.
Identity
What defines us, groups us, and in many cases divides us is a complex combination of social and
organizational characteristics. Typically when one thinks of identity, it is commonly derived in
part by a series of geographical, racial, religious, or political affiliations. The identity of an
institution is in many ways is more direct, formed from governing documentation and its actions.
In the same way, it is more inflexible; in institution does not have the luxury of accommodating a
plethora of identities. UNRWA, as an international humanitarian entity working as a
government, is highly unusual. Moreover, the conflict it finds its work in is steeped in identities,
both old and new. The Palestine Refugees, with their own cultural icons of the keys from their
homes, the train back to their villages, and The Nakba, is a relatively new identity, but one that
UNRWA is bound to. In a sense, can there be an UNRWA without the Palestine Refugees? Can
there be Palestine Refugees without UNRWA? If peace does come, won’t this identity need to be
responsibly dismantled for it to be considered a just peace? The challenge for UNRWA is not
just a matter of diffusing its services to reduce dependency and promote sustainability – without
compromising its commitment to the Right of Return – but to interact with the culture of the
Palestine Refugee responsibly as to not over commit nor make it an obstacle to the peace
process.
UNRWA as a Humanitarian and Development Agency
Starting with tangibles, the history of UNRWA can construct an idea of what models best fit its
current identity. Under its initial response to the Arab-Israel conflict, the newly formed UN
General Assembly commissioned the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees – along with
the International Committee of the Red Cross and other NGOs – to provide direct relief for some
700,000 Palestine Refugees fleeing the conflict. However it was short lived. A report from
UNRPR detailed the severity of the crisis, noting that – due to limited resources – aid from the
UN and the NGO coalition could not continue past the Fall of 1949. (Takkenberg, 2009) It was
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clear that relief for these refugees would not come from providing food and shelter assistance, a
new project would be required to spur integration, development, and improved livelihoods.
In the hopes of drawing lessons from the Great Depression era of public works, the UN
commissioned an Economic Survey Mission led by the President of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, Gordon Clapp. The mission was to evaluate the potential of water works projects in
the Jordan Valley, using lessons from the United State’s efforts to tackle mid-western drought.
The assessment produced by the mission was very optimistic, claiming the strong potential for
public works projects and the possibility of improved regional economics from such projects.
(Takkenberg, 2009) On the recommendations of the report, the UN General Assembly in a vote
of 48-0-6 formed the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East. The six abstentions were from communist countries and South Africa, but Israel had
voted in favor. To commence its operations, UNRWA inherited the registration lists and camp
locations from the UNRPR and ICRC and began its operations on 1 May 1950.
In his historical review of UNRWA’s participatory actions from its founding to the present day,
Terry Rempel claims that a participatory policy was adopted immediately by the Agency; his
examples given included UNRWA hiring local workers to distribute food or enter into an
Agency run trade programme. However, by the standards set through the NRC’s Degrees of
Participation and his own definition that “[T]he fundamental measure of participation is the
degree of control or power exercised by individuals and peoples in determining the course of
their own development” (Rempel, 2009), these types of activities cannot justly be considered
participatory. It is perhaps true that the intention of UNRWA was for it to be a participatory actor
through its model of community centered public works; but by 1956 – when the Suez Crisis
broke out – little had been accomplished in this regard. Noted poetically by Benjamin N. Schiff:
[i]n retrospect, it took a dollop of optimism, or naı¨vete´, to believe that the refugee
problem could be solved with these ambitious water schemes. All the ingredients to
thwart the plans were present: the states of the region were mutually suspicious; the
effort required allocation of a scarce resource over which participating countries were
prepared to fight; the client population did not want to be moved, except back to their
homes; and the time schedule for success, set by U.S. enthusiasm, was very short. In a
pattern later repeated across the Third World, an economic development plan devised by
western experts evaporated when exposed to the dry winds of local, economic, political
and cultural realities. (Schiff, 1995)
Since that point, UNRWA shifted its focus to providing the services that were not accessible to
refugees in a method that maximized efficiency for the Agency. For the most part, UNRWA has
been a driving force for human development in the region. Lex Takkenberg, current Chief of
UNRWA’s Ethics Office, notes in his 2010 article from the Refugee Survey Quarterly:
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Some 1.42 million pupils graduated from UNRWA’s basic nine-year education
cycle…Literacy rates among Palestine refugees compare well with regional and global
levels and enrolment statistics have revealed gender equity since the 1960s. At present,
the Agency operates approximately 690 schools in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab
Republic, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, with an enrolment of nearly 500,000
children... Approximately two-thirds of the registered refugees (approximately 3 million
persons) obtain health services from 137 primary health-care centres. (Takkenberg,
2009)
These services have had good effect on the population, normalizing their lives and provide a
decent standard of living beyond – what some would argue – what is typical for refugee in other
zones. Poverty rates amongst Palestine Refugees in the West Bank are on par with non-refugees.
(Tables 5 & 6)
Table 5: West Bank Percent of Deeply Poor Individuals Pre and Post Assistance in 2010
Pre-assistance
Post-assistance
Change
Refugees
11%
7%
-34%
Inside Camps
21%
15%
-30%
Outside Camps
27%
17%
-35%
Non-refugees
11%
9%
-15%
Source: PCBS, Database of Consumption and Expenditure Survey 2011
Table 6: West Bank Percent of Relatively Poor Individuals Pre and Post Assistance in 2010
Pre-assistance
Post-assistance
Change
Refugees
20%
16%
-22%
Inside Camps
35%
26%
-26%
Outside Camps
40%
32%
-20%
Non-refugees
21%
19%
-6%
Source: PCBS, Database of Consumption and Expenditure Survey 2011
But this is not to say that Palestine Refugees are not vulnerable in other areas. Food security is of
great concern; refugee homes are more likely to be food insecure despite UNRWA assistance
programmes. (Table 7)
Table 7: West Bank Percent of Extremely and Moderately Food Insecure Individuals 2014
Post-assistance
Refugees
22%
Inside Camps
30%
Outside Camps
20%
Non-refugees
14%
Source: SEFSec 2014
While this data should elicit concern, it is not indicative a humanitarian crisis in the West Bank
Field. In the same way that inner cities across the world have limited access to basic nutritional
food sources, so too do the refugees (particularly in densely urban camps) struggle to find
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affordable nutritious food in their community. This speaks more to an issue of development or
urban rehabilitation rather than a humanitarian crisis. As Sari Hanafi put it, “a humanitarian
organization like UNRWA has historically understood its role as a temporary relief provider to a
temporary group of victims, carefully avoiding taking on a wider governing role” (Ḥanafi S.,
Hilal, L., & Takkenberg, A. et al, 2014).
However the WBF is only one of five fields where UNRWA operates, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
and Gaza the other four. It is safe to say that due to the current crisis in Syria and the
repercussions from the 2014 ISF operation in Gaza that humanitarian needs are still under
UNRWA’s purview. Even the WBF takes humanitarian and Emergency action on incidents that
occur with demolitions of refugee and Bedouin dwellings or natural disasters strike. But while
just over 30% of its expenses are applied towards emergency appeal, a majority of UNRWA’s
funds – the programme and project budgets – are dedicated to these standard faire public services
(Table 8).
Table 8: Summary of Agency Financials by Fund Source for 2015 – Unaudited (in Millions US$)
Revenue
Expense
Programme Budget
639.1
766.7
Restricted Funds
16.1
18.5
Microfinance
9.6
9.2
Emergency appeals
418.3
418.8
Projects
180.3
171.1
Inter-Fund elimination
(50.6)
(50.5)
Total
1,212.7
1,333.8
Source: UNRWA Annual Operations Report 2015
Furthermore, UNRWA’s focus is on programmes that improve and develop the livelihoods of the
refugees it serves. It offers a robust microfinance programme that provides business loans and
hosts frequent training initiatives including its tertiary technical training schools through TVET.
Part of the WBF’s Healthy Camp Initiative was to target the Social Determinate of Health to
address the issue in basic and community building way. This type of systemic approach,
combined with its participatory nature of needs assessments and community management of
projects, is a far cry from a traditional humanitarian operation. Indeed at their most generous
these are development efforts, intended to build community capacity and economic growth.
UNRWA as a Government Entity
In embarking on this version of identity analysis, it is important to clarify what the researcher
accepts as basic tenants of government and political theory. First, it is globally accepted that
public services are the responsibility of governments. What defines a service can vary by
country, but the common practice is that basic health care, education, and municipal works are
under the category of public services. Even in matters of privatization, typically a governing
authority manages the public interest. Second, in democratic societies, a populace gives mandate
to a government through elections; in contrast an authoritarian government will devise its own
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mandate. In democratic systems, there is certainly a large range of effectiveness, but this of
course can be tied to the health of the democratic system in that country as a whole; those
countries where populations or civil society institutions have weakened effects on influencing the
direction of their government clearly live in a weaken democracy. Finally, a government has the
ability to govern; in better terms the ability to enforce laws and policies it upholds. In truth
though laws are only as powerful as their enforcement. One of the major issues facing
International Humanitarian Law is its enforcement mechanism, as it its greatly dependent on
states self-policing or policing each other.
On the first count, UNRWA certainly passes the grade; their education and health services –
combined with work that take on for water and sewage networks for West Bank Camps –
represents a clear precedent of the agency providing municipal services. UNRWA health
services are networked and accessible across the field. With reforms such as e-Health and the
Family Health Team, the WBF offers refugees comprehensive medical care no matter if they
move to another city or have complex medical issues that require advanced services.
The second count becomes less clear: their mandate is defined through international paths and
there is simply no means of high-level engagement between UNRWA leadership and refugee
consensus and concerns. Indeed Palestine Refugees are quite fragmented as a population; each
having a completely different experience from one another in each of the five fields, despite
falling under one internationally recognized status. As an example, Palestine Refugees in Jordan
are typically granted Jordanian citizenship, while in Lebanon they are restricted to their camps.
Yet it is because these different experiences and needs exist that it makes it vital for fields to
develop methods of feedback and interaction that place refugees at the center of decision making
and programme building. Since participation is a hallmark of the strategic vision laid out by
UNRWA HQ, it is essential that action towards this direction takes place. As it happens, this can
be an opportunity for the West Bank Field to become a standard-bearer for the agency, through
producing concrete examples of programme behaviors, like the HCI, and mainstream
participation across the field. While their mandate will continue to have a foundation in
international authority, building additional support of an ad hoc mandate from the Palestine
Refugees gives the agency greater access to resources and sustains their mission through
decentralization.
Finally on the third count UNRWA, at least in the WBF, has limited capacity to enforce control
over the Palestine Refugee population. Indeed it has limited ability to enforce control over its
own facilities. WBF schools, health centers, and vehicles are often subject to ISF incursions with
little rebuke. The Agency works with the ISF to coordinate its operations and maintain continuity
of services, but ground forces can be ill prepared and uninformed leading them to take actions
that violate UNRWA’s neutrality. Outside of the conflict, UNRWA has not been able to organize
its West Bank camps as they have expanded haphazardly due to severe population density.
Housing is often built outside of any ordinance or approval process. UNRWA built housing
units, which were designed for a maximum of two floors, can have several more added on top of
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them by residents with growing families. There is simply no means for UNRWA to A: manage
these constructions and B: rebuke individuals who violate UNRWA policy by building past
structural limits. In this area, UNRWA has no recourse. In the WBF, the host governments
consider the camps outside of their managerial bounds and because UNRWA has no
enforcement mechanism, camp residents live in municipal gaps.
The “Phantom Sovereign”
While the researcher has experienced only the West Bank Field of UNRWA, through
conversations and secondary research of the agency as a whole it is abundantly clear that
UNRWA operates more as a governmental body with humanitarian and a development duties
and elements. Like any government, they seek to provide relief when there is disaster and
development where they see stagnations, but this does not absolve their current behavior of
service provider. Taking the points in this section into account, it is the opinion of this researcher
that UNRWA does represent a pseudo government entity, as Sari Hanafi would put it a
“Phantom Sovereign”.
Many actors are playing a role in the governance of the Palestinian refugee camps…our
concern is not the power that stems from the exercise of sovereignty but rather the effects
of power that a governmental technology generates. While UNRWA was not intended to,
nor does it pretend to, govern the camps, it is ascribed the status of a sovereign by many
camp dwellers. (Ḥanafi S., Hilal, L., & Takkenberg, A. et al, 2014)
It is important to note the stress under which this “Phantom Sovereign” exists and how little
control over the conflicts in the region it has. This researcher has seen first-hand damage caused
to UNRWA facilities due to ISF incursions; superficial compared to the occupation of
UNRWA’s Yarmouk camp in Syria by ISIL forces (Smith, 2015) or the shelter UNRWA
provided for over 140,000 civilians fleeing the violence from the 2014 strike against Gaza.
(Badawi, 2014)
UNRWA is a government entity built and maintained because no governing solution effectively
exists for this population as a whole, with no party seeking to take responsibility. This in turn
makes the Agency itself hostage to the conflict it was forged from. As more generations are
steeped in this identity of Palestine Refugee, the needs become less tangible and more intangible.
UNRWA is still a neutral humanitarian agency is in direct conflict with a population whose
identity demands advocacy to their political strife, beyond their humanitarian strife. While
UNRWA has been a steadfast advocate for protection issues and maintenance of human rights, it
cannot advocate for a specific political solution or impose a method of solution upon the
Palestine Refugee population. This prompts the question, does it have an opportunity to relieve
itself from these conflicts?
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Mandate and the Conflict
The Tangible Crisis
In appraising UNRWA’s mandate 60 years on, Lance Bartholomeusz the now Director of Legal
Affairs for the Agency, noted that the mandate has not been as uniformed as it appears.
Bartholomeusz accounted that all of the specific programming within UNRWA, from Education,
Health, camp infrastructure improvements, microfinance etc., had in effect been approved as the
tenure of the agency progressed by the General Assembly through consistent approval of
UNRWA’s budget. Bartholomeusz argues that this is sufficient for UNRWA to consider its
current behaviors sanctioned and supported by the international community. Moreover, this
approval would extend to validate its pseudo-government behaviors by the international
community, but not necessarily the Palestine Refugees. It is ironic then that a democratically
minded body such as the United Nations has placed a mandate upon an agency that has a
dependent population but has not reconciled the undemocratic nature of the agency itself. Again
without a recourse or voice, “…quite understandably, Palestinian refugees’ ire at gaps in
UNRWA’s services is generally expressed via protests against the agency, rather than against the
failure to reach a political solution that would resolve their displacement.” (Roth, 2015) This
speaks to an already present and manifesting conflict amongst the tangible factors.
Currently the Agency supports some 5 million Palestine Refugees with its services. Its mandate
is without a conclusion, beholden to provide these services until a peaceful and just solution to
the conflict is produced. (Bartholomeusz, 2009) In the summer of 2015, the Agency faced a 100
million US$ shortfall which would have kept UNRWA schools closed if not for a last minute
funding drive. (Al Jazeera, 2015) This was not a fluke in the UNRWA budget; the budget had
been running a deficit for roughly four years before it reached its breaking point. While UNRWA
has taken austerity measures to manage future crisis, it will not resolve the overarching issue:
UNRWA’s model is unsustainable. While the refugee population continues to grow,
international aid would have to grow with it. It is an escalating 0-sum game, which only will find
true resolution with the end of the conflict and an answer to the Palestine Refugee issue.
The Intangible Crisis
Yet it is the refugees issue itself that presents a key sticking point for this peace process, with the
Right of Return highly controversial. This right is based off of basic principles of humanitarian
and refugee practice, affording individuals the right to return to their homeland if they so choose.
However the Palestine Refugee situation lasting over sixty years complicates the matter. In some
fields – Jordan for example – Palestine Refugees are both registered with UNRWA and citizens
of Jordan, permitting them access therein to the benefits of Jordanian citizenship plus the
services of UNRWA. In this case they carry duel and conflicting identities, “refugee citizen”, in
flight but integrated. This has led to the assertion from some scholars that the identity of
Palestine Refugee is more a political tool that prolongs the conflict. Quoted at a conference on
discussing UNRWA, Asaf Romirowsky of the Pro-Israeli Scholars for Peace in the Middle East
made this statement:
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’The Nakba mentality is ingrained within them [the refugees],’ Romirowsky said. ‘Until
that is changed, they will be doing much of the same,’ meaning that they will continue to
elect to be dependent on UNRWA. (Shwayder, 2014)
This challenge to the refugee identity is a common theme from UNRWA’s critics. Unlike
UNHCR, UNRWA’s definition on who gains the status of refugee is by comparison quite
generous, and even allows for generational inheritance of the status for descendants of male
refugees. (UNRWA Refugees, 2016) While many live outside of the camps, they are not
considered settled.
The General Assembly allowed an option to resettle refugees where they stand in UNGA
Resolution 194 (III) Paragraph 11 of 1948, which predates but influences UNRWA’s founding
mandate none the less. It stated:
…refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage
to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made
good by the Governments or authorities responsible… (Appendix C)
Despite this, reintegration and resettlement appears to been taken off the table from an early
stage, in part due to refugee identity and in part by Arab states who sought to kept the refugee
matter unsettled through reintegration. This was highlighted in a 1957 Annual Report of the
Director of UNRWA:
The great mass of the refugees continues to believe that a grave injustice has been done
to them and to express a desire to return to their homeland. In particular, they request
the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11
December 1948 concerning repatriation and compensation. It is not possible to estimate
how many refugees would in fact accept an opportunity to be repatriated if that
repatriation were to mean something different from returning to their old homes.
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that many are establishing themselves in new lives, the
refugees collectively remain opposed to certain types of self-support projects which they
consider would mean permanent resettlement and the abandonment of hope of
repatriation. They are, in general, supported in this stand by the Arab host Governments.
On the other hand, the Government of Israel has taken no affirmative action in the matter
of repatriation and compensation. It remains the Director's opinion that, unless the
refugees are given the choice between repatriation and compensation provided for in
resolution 194 (III), or unless some other solution acceptable to all parties is found, it
would be unrealistic for the General Assembly to believe that decisive progress can be
accomplished by UNRWA towards the "reintegration of the refugees into the economic
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life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement" in line with General
Assembly resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950. (UNRWA Report, 1957)
A similar thought was affirmed in the 1962 Annual Report:
The frustrated attempts of UNRWA during its initial years in sponsoring work projects to
settle refugees and the virtually fruitless outcome of past broader efforts, under other
auspices, to negotiate a settlement of the Palestine problem, strongly suggest that these
undertakings have failed because they have been unacceptable to the people (refugee and
non-refugee) indigenous to the region and to the Governments which represent them. It is
the considered opinion of the Commissioner-General that these feelings of the Arab
people run as deep today as at any time in the past, and therefore that, at least for as
long as there is no substantial progress towards the implementation of paragraph 11 of
General Assembly resolution 194 (III), UNRWA should not again attempt works projects
designed to settle the refugees. From this experience one should not conclude that
economic development is not wanted by the people of the region. On the contrary, it is
wanted and at an accelerated rate but not in the context of refugee resettlement.
(UNRWA Report, 1962)
The reality of the modern Palestine Refugee speaks volumes though. These people are
participants in the economies they live in and around, not isolated even if they live in the camps.
Despite UNRWA, there are still services that require refugees to engage in the local economy,
from purchasing food, to utilities, to cell phones. Despite this de facto integration, their identity
and status stress that this condition is temporary. In some respects, it is slightly religious, a
promise of a better life once peace and a homecoming reign. Similar to UNRWA, the Palestine
Refugee identity depends on a resolution to the conflict to fix its core complaint.
An yet UNRWA cannot seem to truly lockstep with this population; Palestine Refugees find
themselves at odds with UNRWA as well. While the Agency is a steadfast advocate for Palestine
Refugees and other IDPs from the conflict (in the case of the West Bank, Bedouin communities,
those cut off from services by the ISF Barrier, and registered persons from the 1967 conflict), it
still is obligated to neutrality as a UN agency, and cannot over extend its efforts to fulfill every
demand of the population it serves. In UNRWA’s WBF schools, children are taught under the
Palestinian Authority’s national curriculum, however UNRWA addresses the conflict from
outside a PA nationalist perspective. It instead teaches students a curriculum called Human
Right, Conflict Resolution and Tolerance in order to give an internationalist approach. This
could be where a disconnect occurs: dependent on UNRWA for government style services,
Palestine Refugees may have a greater expectation of commitment to their cause from UNRWA
than what it can actually deliver. This can be seen through the fears exhibited by Palestine
Refugees and their community leaders whenever a reform or change is made.
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UNRWA offices in the WBF have found themselves under frequent protest following austerity
actions and programme redesign over the past twelve months. In truth some of these redesigns
were meant to ease service provision and promote dignity, for example transferring the SSNP
food support from physical distributions to an equitable cash stipend. Yet, because programme
information is frequently ineffectively communicated and due to a lack of overall trust between
the Agency and the population, refugee leaders protest and disrupt field operations because they
fear any change as a step towards UNRWA’s withdrawal (Interview, Programmatic). This fear is
not unfounded; refugees have legitimate security and protection concerns that leave them
vulnerable. Following the destruction of Jenin Camp by the ISF, the Agency undertook
reconstruction efforts with a community-based approach (The ‘Urban Redesign”, 2012). One
issue occurred pertaining to how the Agency rebuilt the roads through the camp:
…several years later, (the road construction) still generated anger and frustration…Most
of the refugees I interviewed described the roads as exposing them to greater insecurity,
violence, and night raids by Israeli jeeps. In the words of an (Emergency Committee)
member: “Before the Israeli jeeps and tanks could not enter the camp. Now they have
built the camp in such a way . . . that night incursions occur regularly. The jeeps enter
very easily and can make their way throughout the camp”. Even those who supported the
plan and were generally happy with the result continued to have misgivings about
security (The “Urban Redesign”, 2012)
The Agency constructed large roads to ease the mobility of emergency vehicles and promote
better urban conditions for the community, best practices in urban design and planning, but
despite these intentions, the community seemed to receive this as the Agency exposing them to
ISF raids. This returns the discussion to the issue of governance, for UNRWA cannot truly
demarcate its population with adequate territorial protections and policies. This again is not truly
a failing on the agency’s part, rather an example of the conflict of sovereign versus phantom
sovereign, a disconnect from the political needs of the population UNRWA serves.
If a solution occurs but this refugee identity is not addressed – through reparations or other
means – peace may not last. In an ironic twist, the same motivation that might drive an illegal
Israeli settler – the zeal of ones cultural identity to the land – could become the very same drive
that manifests in the Palestine Refugee populace. Individuals, generations and generations
removed from any experience on the land of their ancestors might one day seek reclamation or
consider themselves a diaspora. In some ways it could become a cycle, albeit one of destruction
and imbalance.
With the reasonable expectation that peace for the Arab-Israeli conflict is not forthcoming, what
must occur – through a participatory lens if possible – is an evaluation of UNRWA’s mandate
projected 5, 10, or 15 years from now. Can the same level of care be provided given the harsh
realities of finances and population growth? If so, where do the solutions to these stressors come
from? If not, then what is the way forward?
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The Counterpoints
From the other perspective of the conflict, nationalist Israeli’s would see UNRWA dismissed
altogether or replaced with UNHCR. They take a very surface approach to the argument; “[the]
organization whose raison d’être is fraudulent and whose self-preservation hinges on making
sure the problem entrusted to it is never solved.” (The Jerusalem Post, 2015) But this line of
thought could be applied to any humanitarian endeavor; is it not also true of the WHO and
cancer researchers fighting for a cure? Or UNICEF fighting to end child poverty? This line of
logic from the nationalist voices within Israel would rather scapegoat UNRWA than recognize
that UNRWA’s existence is largely dependent on the resolution of the conflict, and the
reconciliation of all of its baggage.
However, within academia over the past few years there has been more discussion on the validity
of UNRWA and its mission that dive deeper into the issues. There are scholars, Palestinians and
former UNRWA employees amongst them, who argue that UNRWA’s existence prolongs the
conflict through perpetuating – in effect – the identity of refugees who they argue are akin to
recipients of welfare rather than refugees. James G. Lindsay, a former senior lawyer at UNRWA,
begins his critique by noting that the rhetoric of transferring responsibility from UNRWA to
UNHCR is nonsensical. He notes that this is under an assumption that a change of guard would
depoliticize the Palestine Refugee issue or remove the identity all together. He says though:
What the critics are really asking for is a General Assembly decision to change its
overarching mandate from preserving Palestinian refugees’ well-being and refugee
status to actively encouraging, if not forcing, resettlement and an end to refugee status—
regardless of which agency is entrusted with this mandate. As noted earlier, there is no
majority support in the General Assembly for such a change; in fact, an overwhelming
majority opposes it. (Lindsay, 2009)
Despite the Agency not fully following through on UNGA Resolution 194 (III) paragraph 11, it
appears integration is already occurring; “According to UNRWA, more than two-thirds of the
registered refugees have moved out of refugee camps and into the general population of the
countries or areas in which they live.” (Lindsay, 2012) If accurate, this would reinforce the
observations that camps are more like urban slums, sheltering the most impoverished rather than
a majority of this population. But more to Lindsay’s point, it highlights the issue of refugee
status as an assumed condition of need, debating construct of the identity:
For instance, a man who fled in 1948 from what is now Israel and was registered as a
refugee (first generation refugee) could have had a male child with a non-refugee; that
child (a second generation refugee) could have himself grown up and had a male child
with a non-refugee and then that male child (a third generation refugee) could have had
a male child (a fourth generation refugee) with a non-refugee. Although such a fourth
generation refugee would have only one-eighth "refugee blood" and even though he, his
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parents, and his grandparents may have never set foot in what is now Israel, for UNRWA
they all remain refugees entitled to repatriation to their "homes" there. (Lindsay, 2012)
On the other side of the argument, there is perhaps more sympathy for UNRWA but a similar
conclusion about the role of the UNGA when it comes to solving this problem. These supporters
have argued that an outright dismissal of UNRWA or the relief support it provides – regardless
of its flaws on the governmental service side – ignores the premise of its existence; it persists
because nothing has been solved and violence continues. These advocates support the theme that
UNRWA, and in affect the Palestine Refugees, can only be resolved through a resolution to the
conflict as a whole, acknowledging the unsustainable condition of the Agency:
UNRWA cannot hope to protect and provide for Palestinian refugees indefinitely. It does
not, as the [Political] Right frequently argues, bear sole responsibility for prolonging the
Palestinian refugee crisis. On the contrary: it is the ongoing lack of a political solution
— a process in which UNRWA’s mandate does not allow it to participate — that has
dragged the agency, and by extension the Palestinians reliant upon it, into this quagmire.
(Roth, 2015)
In a pragmatic sense however, any repatriation would be impossible at this point in time. The
Israel envoy to the UN, Ron Prosor, made their dissent clear: “The right of return…would ‘flood
Israel with millions of refugees, and drown the Jewish state by sheer numbers.’” (Shwayder,
2014) If a scenario where all registered Palestine Refugees were given right of return, the
population of Israel would increase by 62% and make the Jewish population a minority group;
this is apart from any economic impacts that reparations would make. There is undeniably some
who would seek this type of solution, those more interested in scoring peace over Israel than a
just peace for all parties, but it is hardly a possible or sustainable goal. To resolve the Palestine
Refugee identity, they must be given agency to govern, either through a state they already reside
in,
The Politics
UNRWA cannot escape its role from the conflict anymore than the governments who are placed
in the center of it. With the continuation of its mandate from the General Assembly, there is a
glimmer of a victim. Humanitarian organizations are not designed to develop into political tools,
though they are subject to the games of the nation-states around them. For a humanitarian agency
to be so central to a conflict however is unprecedented; to leave its burden unresolved for
decades is, in the opinion of this researcher, the fault of the international community. They are
not without sin, but they have existed in good faith to their mission. Humanitarian assistance is
by design supposed to be temporary; arguing UNRWA’s continued existence on humanitarian
grounds 65 years later begs the question if UNRWA is capable of success, and if so what is the
measure of that success? The counterpoints to UNRWA aside, is its continued existence not a
version of international governance in procrastination? Or perhaps that claim unfair due to the
dire condition of the peace process.
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But as noted in the previous section, while the Agency’s activities are approved by the General
Assembly (Bartholomeusz, 2009) this is not a sign of stability; this is instead a sign of
resignation to the issue, a procrastination measure on the part of the international community due
to the lack of political willpower to resolve the core conflict.
Reforms
This paper has explored the depths of UNRWA’s actions and identity, but really this article is a
document about its future. There is little doubt, based on the observations and statistical evidence
that UNRWA is on an unsustainable path. Particularly in the West Bank, where the Israeli
Occupation will hit its 50th year in 2017, UNRWA has held the line of services for a population
with little recourse otherwise. But clearly this is not sustainable; the Agency’s recent round of
austerity measures will not stem them for long as the refugee population grows. To fulfill its
mandate, ironically UNRWA will have to let go of some control. Evidence from the case study
and from the attitudes of those interviewed suggests that the most viable path forward for
UNRWA is to seriously implement participatory reforms. While participation is upheld already
as a tenant of their MTS and Protection principles, this study bears clearly that the WBF has thus
far seen little action in this direction at an HQ or multi-field level.
In times of crisis the agency must make decisions to ensure service continuation in an expedient
manner, however this is currently done without refugee inclusion. Yet there is good reason for
this, time is typically a factor and there is no means to collect feedback from the communities on
every crisis or strategic decision. But this exemplifies the issue with UNRWA’s structure, in
times of austerity or crisis the agency should not have to consult the refugee communities on
their current needs and priorities because it should already have that information on hand. In
researching participation practices, it was noted that UNRWA conducts low-level activities, not
higher than information transfer (Appendix A) by way of consultations or focus groups after a
project or initiative takes place. As a case example, the Healthy Camp Initiative has made an
effort to work on needs assessments for communities before project design even occurs, this can
and has enabled higher-level participatory activities throughout the HCI. By partnering with
NGOs and Universities to do the actual needs assessment works, UNRWA removes its own
biases from the results. The focus now should be on how does UNRWA institutionalize this data
in a way that will inform strategic decision makers without tampering with the raw results.
UNRWA statistics on refugees are well documented, published, and disseminated throughout the
agency; it is vital to look into how needs and priority assessments of various communities can be
summarized and disseminated in this same fashion. Certainly the HCI is a small example of this
practice, but it can be a model to expand UNRWA’s methods
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Conclusion
For the International Community
Most of the authors cited in this work agree that to some extent that UNRWA is beyond its
depth, and this is has little recourse due to its mandate. There was also a sense of apathy that the
UNGA and the International Community will not make any moves to resolve these issues. There
is no doubt this is true, but it also is irresponsible then to focus on a component that is powerless
to its directive. UNRWA deserves critique but not for the state of the conflict, in that it has been
used as a scapegoat by some. And while it is a clear symbol of this procrastinator approach to the
conflict, it alone does not have the capacity to diffuse the crisis. UNRWA can only delay, persist,
until a point where unsustainability catches up with it.
In the present though, if it is accepted that the International Community is responsible for
refugees, then identity of the Palestine Refugee presents a challenge to a true peace process. This
researcher is concerned that even if the conflict were resolved but the right of return not fulfilled,
would the identity still persist? Would these people not still feel beholden to their symbols of
Keys or the train home? Or would a new sense of identity supersede this, one of a new State of
Palestine, should that resolution occur. For many, they will still remain stigmatized, representing
poorest amongst the communities they live in and dependent on free or subsidized services.
Overall it is clear that at this point there can be no political solution without a social and
communal solution. For the politics will not resolve how to acclimatize the mass migration of
refugees to a new homeland should it be found or remove the stigma that comes with Palestine
Refugee amongst their peers.
For the Conflict
It would be unproductive to leave the conflict resolution process unmentioned, however this
paper did not engage the topic of the conflict in its entirety. An assessment at this point would be
incomplete, such an evaluation would require a more comprehensive study rather than a focus on
one faction, UNRWA and Palestine Refugees. That said the issues discussed in this paper are
inextricably linked to the conflict. As it stands, presently the Right of Return – as steeped in
international law as it is – has a smaller and smaller chance of becoming a reality, as the
Palestine Refugees registered with UNRWA grow in numbers. There is however still opportunity
for resettlement in the West Bank, should the almost 50-year occupation and Israeli Settlement
construction ends. To this end, one fascinating discussion with a strategic level staff member of
the WBFO led to this diagram:
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Figure 5: Modeling Israeli Policy Priorities

This model accepts that Israel is the dominate power in the West Bank and can implement its
will without much rebuke. As an example, the occupation, seizure of land, demolitions, and
settlement construction have gone on for several decades now without international action
beyond some auditory rebukes. Currently there is little interest to give up control of the West
Bank, despite the Oslo Accord’s roadmap. However there appears – at least in rhetoric – to be a
deep interest in keeping Israel a home for the Jewish people and a Liberal Democracy. As Figure
5 indicates, there is a gulf that separates these policies, and realistically only two can be
implemented to full effect. If Israel controls the West Bank but gives credence and preferential
treatment to Israeli citizens and Jewish settlers, then they create a second-class citizen status for
West Bank ID holders – including Palestine Refugees – and thus diminish their status as a true
democratic state. On the other hand, ending the occupation and control of the West Bank could
balance the model. Finally, control of the West Bank and maintaining a liberal democratic status
would require equal treatment for all, a One-state solution.
This model simplifies matters based on the power-over and control Israel has in the conflict at
this time. Israel has time and time again demonstrated its military efficiency; this combined with
US support places the state of Israel in the driver’s seat of the conflict. The model also does not
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account for the numerous issues towards a peace process, such as rights to holy sites, Gaza, and
the settlements already in place (should Israel pull out of the West Bank). But it is a starting
point given the current situation and the dominant position of Israel. In clarifying which two
policies it desires, responses and preparations can be made regarding a two-state or one-state
solution. Until that time, there is little ambition from either side to do anything more, content in
the knowledge that UNRWA will take care of those victim to this almost 70 year long process.
For UNRWA
Without an end to its mandate in sight, UNRWA must prepare for the eventuality that the needs
of those they serve will surpass their capacity. It was therefore recommended in the case study
report for UNRWA on HCI Best Practices and Lessons Learned that the WBF can take this void
as an opportunity to become a model for the agency and role out more systematic participatory
reforms, based on the HCI if desirable. How it occurs is ultimately dependent on current field
resources and politics, however this type of reform will be of vital importance to build a
sustainable future for UNRWA’s services while it waits for a resolution to the conflict. Through
participatory reforms UNRWA could act more like a coordinator rather than a provider, an
essential shift for diminishing dependence and deinstitutionalizing itself in these communities.
While certain programmes and facilities could still be managed by UNRWA, enabling
community action in the form of equitable elections and control would decentralize service
responsibility and give greater agency to CBO actors to solve their community’s needs. Sari
Hanafi came to a similar conclusion, comparing UNHCR’s reforms made in the 1990s to foster
community participation, suggesting that UNRWA could even organize elections to foster more
appropriate camp governance. While Hanafi cautions that UNHCR’s approach was a top-down
mechanism, there is an encouraging lesson to take away from this practice. (Hanafi, Hilal,
Takkenberg, 2014)
Through the networks of the Healthy Camp Committees, CBOs have fund raises, planned, and
implemented solutions to those problems, with UNRWA as a partner rather than sole
implementer. These roles are traditionally in UNRWA wheelhouse, however the HCI provides a
proof of concept that these responsibilities can be – in effect – decentralized. By promoting
community empowerment, UNRWA has the ability to reduce its responsibilities while still
maintaining its mandate through a more support role approach, acting as a networker and
facilitator. Through proper identification of positive community partners leading to a subsequent
decentralization of power UNRWA can build trustful partnerships with the refugees it serves and
secures for itself a modern and equitable method of fulfilling its mandate.
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Appendix A
Table 9: NRC’s Degrees of Participation
Degree of Participation

Definition

Ownership

The community controls decision-making

Interactive

The community is wholly involved in the decision-making with
other actors

Functional

The community fulfills only a particular role with limited
decision-making power (for example, forming a water
committee which is then supervised by an NGO staff member)

Material Motivation

The community receives goods or cash in return for a service or
role

Consultation

The community is asked for their opinion on what they would
like to see, but their opinion has limited sway in decisionmaking

Information Transfer

Information is gathered from the community, but they are not
involved in the resulting discussions which inform decisions

Passive

The community is informed of decisions and actions, but have
no say in either the process or the result
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Appendix B

GFO

Programme Budget
Projects
Emergency Appeal
Total

Expenditure
297,817,562
110,986,676
218,283,798
627,088,036

JFO

Programme Budget
Projects
Emergency Appeal
Total

139,444,412
13,945,168
9,817,677
163,207,256

LFO

Programme Budget
Projects
Emergency Appeal
Total

101,455,038
36,356,200
44,580,396
182,391,635

SFO

Programme Budget
Projects
Emergency Appeal
Total

35,916,921
16,317,116
136,669,538
188,903,575

WBFO

Programme Budget
Projects
Emergency Appeal
Total

133,971,302
18,520,635
24,879,572
177,371,510

HQ

Programme Budget
Projects
Emergency Appeal
Total

58,079,765
7,013,957
1,176,189
66,269,910

Agency

Table 10: UNRWA Expenditure Statistics by Field 2015

Programme Budget
Projects
Emergency Appeal
Total

766,685,000
203,139,752
435,407,169.9
1,405,231,922
Source: UNRWA Annual Operations Report 2015
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GFO

Number of Camps
Registered Refugees
Other Registered Persons*
Average Family Size

8
1,311,920
76,748
4.3

JFO

Number of Camps
Registered Refugees
Other Registered Persons*
Average Family Size

10
2,144,233
103,535
4.5

LFO

Number of Camps
Registered Refugees
Other Registered Persons*
Average Family Size

12
458,369
46,007
3.8

SFO

Number of Camps
Registered Refugees
Other Registered Persons*
Average Family Size

9
560,000
70,035
3.6

WBFO

Number of Camps
Registered Refugees
Other Registered Persons*
Average Family Size

19
792,081
178,552
4.0

Agency

Table 11: UNRWA Population and Camps by Field 2015

Number of Camps
Registered Refugees*
Other Registered Persons
Average Family Size

58
5,266,603
474,877
4.0
Source: UNRWA Annual Operations Report 2015

* Other registered persons refers to those who, at the time of original registration, did not satisfy
all of UNRWA’s Palestine Refugee criteria, but who were determined to have suffered
significant loss and/or hardship for reasons related to the 1948 conflict in Palestine; they also
include persons who belong to the families of other registered persons.
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Appendix C
UNGA Resolution 194 (III)
11 December 1948
The General Assembly,
Having considered further the situation in Palestine,
1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the
late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation
of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and Extends its thanks to the Acting
Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;
2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United
Nations which shall have the following functions:
a. To assume, insofar as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the
functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;
b. To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present
resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by
the General Assembly or by the Security Council;
c. To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now
assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations
Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to
the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the
remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security
Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;
3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall
present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly,
for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States
which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;
4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment
of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible
date;
5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the
negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and
to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or
directly with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;
6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Government and
authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between
them;
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7. Resolves that the Holy Places—including Nazareth—religious buildings and sites in
Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing
rights and historical practice that arrangements to this end should be under effective
United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in
presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposal for
a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include
recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the
Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political
authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the
protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be
presented to the General Assembly for approval;
8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area,
including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns,
the most Eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most Southern, Bethlehem; the most
Western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most
Northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of
Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;
Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of
Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the
General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the
Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive
groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;
The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative
who shall cooperate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration
of the Jerusalem area;
9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the
Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road,
rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine; Instructs the Conciliation
Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that
organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;
10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and
authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area,
including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and
communication facilities;
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should
be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; Instructs the Conciliation
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Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close
relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and,
through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;
12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ
such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the
effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution; The
Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities
responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures
necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a
limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;
13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the
Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the
United Nations;
14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to cooperate with the Conciliation
Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present
resolution;
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make
appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the
terms of the present resolution.
UNGA Resolution 302 (IV)
8 December 1949
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 212 (III) 2/ of 19 November 1948 and 194 (III) 3/ of 11 December 1948,
affirming in particular the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter resolutions,
Having examined with appreciation the first interim report 4/ of the United Nations Economic
Survey Mission for the Middle East and the report 5/ of the Secretary-General on assistance to
Palestine refugees,
1. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments which have generously responded to the
appeal embodied in its resolution 212 (III), and to the appeal of the Secretary-General, to
contribute in kind or in funds to the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress
among the Palestine refugees;
2. Expresses also its gratitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the
League of Red Cross Societies and to the American Friends Service Committee for the
contribution they have made to this humanitarian cause by discharging, in the face of
great difficulties, the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of relief
supplies and the general care of the refugees; and welcomes the assurance they have
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given the Secretary-General that they will continue their co-operation with the United
Nations until the end of March 1950 on a mutually acceptable basis;
Commends the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the
important contribution which it has made towards the United Nations programme of
assistance; and commends those specialized agencies which have rendered assistance in
their respective fields, in particular the World Health Organization, the United nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Refugee
Organization;
Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations
which have materially assisted in bringing relief to Palestine refugees;
Recognizes that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General
Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, continued assistance for the relief of
the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among
them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures
should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international
assistance for relief;
Considers that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9(d) of the present resolution, the
equivalent of approximately $33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works
programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of
$20,200,000 is required for direct relief and $13,500,000 for works programmes; that the
equivalent of approximately $21,200,000 will be required for works programmes from 1
January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief
should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by
the General Assembly at its fifth regular session;
Establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East:
a. To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works
programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;
b. To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to
be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief
and works projects is no longer available;
Establishes an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,
with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing
Governments, to advise and assist the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the execution of the programme; the
Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each near Eastern Government
concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects;
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9. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint the Director of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in consultation with the
Governments represented on the Advisory Commission;
a. The Director shall be the chief executive officer of the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East responsible to the General
Assembly for the operation of the programme;
b. The Director shall select and appoint his staff in accordance with general
arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of
the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Director and the
Secretary-General shall agree are applicable, and to the extent possible utilize the
facilities and assistance of the Secretary-General;
c. The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, establish financial
regulations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East;
d. Subject to the financial regulations established pursuant to clause (c) of the
present paragraph, the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission,
shall apportion available funds between direct relief and works projects in their
discretion, in the event that the estimates in paragraph 6 require revision;
10. Requests the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable
date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and administration of the
programme, and of adopting rules of procedure;
11. Continues the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees as established under General
Assembly resolution 212 (III) until 1 April 1950, or until such date thereafter as the
transfer referred to in paragraph 12 is affected, and requests the Secretary-General in
consultation with the operating agencies to continue the endeavour to reduce the numbers
of rations by progressive stages in the light of the findings and recommendations of the
Economic Survey Mission;
12. Instructs the Secretary-General to transfer to the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the assets and liabilities of the United
Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees by 1 April 1950, or at such date as may be agreed
by him and the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East;
13. Urges all Members of the United Nations and non-members to make voluntary
contributions in funds or in kind to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required
is obtained for each period of the programme as set out in paragraph 6; contributions in
funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar in so far as the
programme can be carried out in such currencies;
14. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for
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this purpose and not exceeding $5,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to finance
operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31
December 1950 from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under
paragraph 13 above;
15. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with the International Refugee
Organization for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of
$2,800,000 to finance the programme subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for
repayment;
16. Authorizes the Secretary-General to continue the Special Fund established under General
Assembly resolution 212 (III) and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operation of the
United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, uponä the request of the Director, for
the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East;
17. Calls upon the Governments concerned to accord to the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the privileges, immunities, exemptions
and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for Palestine
Refugees, together with all other privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities
necessary for the fulfilment of its functions;
18. Urges the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International
Refugee Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other
appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the
Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East, to furnish assistance within the framework of the programme;
19. Requests the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East:
a. To appoint a representative to attend the meeting of the Technical Assistance
Board as observer so that the technical assistance activities of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may be coordinated with the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and
specialized agencies referred to in Economic and Social Council resolution 222
(IX) A 6/ of 15 August 1949;
b. To place at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board full information
concerning any technical assistance work which may be done by the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in
order that it may be included in the reports submitted by the Technical Assistance
Board to the Technical Assistance committee of the Economic and Social
Council;
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20. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best
interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General
Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948;
21. Requests the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual
report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and invites him to submit to the
Secretary-General such other reports as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East may wish to bring to the attention of Members of the
United Nations, or its appropriate organs;
22. Instructs the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to transmit the final
report of the Economic Survey Mission, with such comments as it may wish to make, to
the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.
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